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TEXT OF STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1001 (1953 as amended) provides, in
relevant part:
41-la-1001. Definitions.
(4) "Owner" means the person who has the legal right to
possession of the vehicle.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316 (1953 as amended) provides:
41-la-1316. Receiving or transferring stolen motor vehicle,
trailer, or semitrailer—Penalty.
It is a second degree felony for a person:
(1) with intent to procure or pass title to a motor
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer that he knows or has reason
to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken to receive or
transfer possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer from or to another; or
(2) to have in his possession any motor vehicle,
trailer, or semitrailer that he knows or has reason to
believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken if he is not a
peace officer engaged at the time in the performance of his
duty.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-504 (1953 as amended provides, in relevant
part:
70A-9-504. Secured party's right to dispose of collateral
after default — Effect of disposition.
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or
otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its
then condition or following any commercially reasonable
preparation or processing.
. . . .

(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or
private proceedings and may be made by way of one or more
contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in
parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but every
aspect of the disposition including the method, manner,
time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable.
Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline
speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a
recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and
place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the
time after which any private sale or other intended
disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party
to the debtor, if he has not signed after default a
statement renouncing or modifying his right to notification
of sale. . . . [Notification shall be sent to any other
secured party from whom the secured party has received
(before sending his notification to the debtor or before the

iii

debtor's renunciation of his rights) written notice of a
claim of interest in the collateral. . . .
(4) When collateral is disposed of by a secured party
after default, the disposition transfers to a purchaser for
value all of the debtor's rights therein, discharges the
security interest under which it is made and any security
interest or lien subordinate thereto. . . .

iv

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No. 940528-CA
v«

Priority No. 2

DERALD ROSS,
Defendant/Appellant.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994) and Rule 26(2) (a) of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, whereby a defendant in a
district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of
Appeals from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other
than a first degree or capital felony.

In this case, a jury in

the court of the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, rendered final judgment and conviction against Mr. Ross for
"Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Motor Vehicle," a second
degree felony.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Did the trial court err in convicting Mr. Ross of
Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Motor Vehicle under Utah Code
Ann. § 41-la-112?
(a)

Was there sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of

Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Motor Vehicle?
(b)

Was the trial court in error to deny Mr. Ross's motion

for a directed verdict for Mr. Ross at the close of the State's
case?

(c)

Was Appellant properly convicted of Receiving or

Transferring a Stolen Motor Vehicle even though the title to said
vehicle was in his name from the time Mr. Ross purchased said
vehicle to the time of his criminal information?
(d)

Was the trial court in error to deny Mr. Ross's Motion

to Dismiss the State's case?
^ STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Motor Vehicle, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1953 as
amended).

A jury found Mr. Ross guilty after two-day trial held

on August 2nd and 3rd, 1994, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick,
Judge, presiding.
The trial court sentenced Mr. Ross to a term of 2 years at
the Utah State Prison.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

On November 16, 1990, Mr. Ross purchased a 1977 Dodge

Charger ("Charger"), VIN # XS22G7R267849, for $60.00.
(Transcript of August 2 and August 3, 1994, hereinafter "T", at
1:145.)
2.

On February 21, 1991, Mr. Ross and his wife, Rebecca

Ross registered the Charger with the Motor Vehicle Division.

The

Motor Vehicle Division issued a Utah Certificate of Title for the
Charger to Rebecca and/or Derald Ross.
3.

(T, at 1:44-47.)

On October 30, 1992, Mr. Ross obtained a loan from Quick

Loan and pledged the Charger as security.
2

(T, at 1:61-63, 1:149-

150.)
4.

The loan agreement between Mr. Ross and Quick Loan

states, in relevant part:
Lender will give you at least ten days notice of any public
sale or the date after which Lender will agree to have a
private sale.
(T, at 1:82, 1:150.)
5.

On or about November of 1992, Mr. Ross took the Charger

to the home of Glen Burns in Stockton, Utah, and left the Charger
there.

(T, at 1:111-112.)

During that time, Mr. Ross defaulted

on the loan from Quick Loan.
6.

On either April 12 or April 13, 1993, American Recovery

Services took possession of the Charger from Mr. Burns1 home in
Stockton, Utah.
7.

(T, at 1:73.)

On either April 12 or April 13, 1993, Quick Loan

attempted to notify Mr. Ross by mail that Quick Loan had
repossessed the Charger.
8.

(T, at 1:74.)

On April 22 or April 23, 1993, American Recovery

Services transferred possession of the Charger to Quick Loan.
(T, at 1:73-74, 1:83, 1:86.)
9.

On May 4, 1993, Quick Loan sold the Charger to J&K Auto.

(T, at 1:75.)

J&K took possession of the Charger.

The Charger

was then parked on Main Street, with nothing to indicate that J&K
Auto owned the Charger.
10.

(T, at 1:92.)

On or about May 10, 1993, while Mr. Ross was driving to

his father's home along Main Street in Salt Lake City.

Mr. Ross

saw the Charger parked on the curb with his license plates on the
3

Charger,

Mr. Ross took possession of the Charger.

(T, 1:152-

154.)
11.

On or about May 18, 1993, Mr. Ross and Guy Gritton took

the Charger to Quality Emissions.

Between August and September

of 1993f the Charger was towed to Ron Ison's mechanic's shop.
(T, at 1:98-101, 1:119.)
12.

On or about November 30, 1993, Mr. Ross received a

letter from the State of Utah stating, in relevant part:
The above-described vehicle [the Charger] was impounded on
November 29, 1993, by the Motor Vehicle Division.
Information available indicates you have an interest in this
vehicle.
(T, at 1:159).
13.

On January 18, 1994, the State of Utah filed an

information against Mr. Ross for Receiving or Transferring a
Stolen Motor Vehicle in violation of Utah Code Annotated section
41-la-1316(2).
14.
auction.

On February 2, 1994, the Charger was sold at an impound
Prior to that date, the Motor Vehicle Division listed

the owner of the Charger as Rebecca Ross and/or Derald Ross.

(T,

at 1:49.)
15.

On August 3, 1994, a jury found Mr. Ross guilty of

Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Motor Vehicle, a second degree
felony.

(T, at 11:69.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

There was insufficient evidence to establish that Mr. Ross
was guilty of the crime of Receiving or Transferring a Stolen
Motor Vehicle.

Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316, when read in
4

conjunction with relevant case and statutory law, seems to
require that possession of the property of another is a requisite
element of the crime.
The facts in this case fail to establish that Mr. Ross was
not the owner of the vehicle that the State alleged was stolen at
the time Mr. Ross possessed it. Concomitantly, the evidence
establishing that Mr. Ross knew or believed that the vehicle was
stolen at the time he possessed it was so insubstantial that
reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt as
to his guilt.

Therefore, this Court should reverse the

conviction of Mr. Ross and remand this matter to the trial court
for acquittal.
ARGUMENT
POINT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING APPELLANT'S CONVICTION OF
RECEIVING OR TRANSFERRING A STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. S 41-la-1316.
A. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR A JURY TO CONVICT
MR. ROSS OF RECEIVING OR TRANSFERRING A STOLEN VEHICLE.
Due process requires that the state prove beyond a
reasonable doubt each and every element of the offense charged.
State v. Cox, 751 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah 1988), citing Patterson
v. New York. 432 U.S. 197, 211, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2327, 53 L.Ed.2d
287 (1977).

Where a defendant claims on appeal that there was

insufficient evidence to establish one or more elements of the
crime for which he was convicted, the standard of review differs
depending on whether the case was tried to the bench or to a
jury.

See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-3 (Utah 1987).
5

When an appellate court in this state reviews the sufficiency of
evidence in a case tried to a jury, this Court "will reverse a
conviction if the evidence is so insubstantial or inconclusive
that reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a reasonable
doubt as to a defendant's guilt."

State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221,

222 (Utah 1986).*
In the present case, a jury convicted Mr. Ross of Receiving
or Transferring a Stolen Motor Vehicle under Utah Code Ann. § 41la-1316(2) (1953 as amended).

Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316

provides:
41-la-1316. Receiving or transferring stolen motor vehicle,
trailer, or semitrailer—PenaltyIt is a second degree felony for a person:
(1) with intent to procure or pass title to a motor
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer that he knows or has reason
to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken to receive or
transfer possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or
semitrailer from or to another; or
(2) to have in his possession any motor vehicle,
trailer, or semitrailer that he knows or has reason to
believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken if he is not a
peace officer engaged at the time in the performance of his
duty.
As the title of the statute indicates, this statute focuses
on the transfer and receipt of stolen vehicles, trailers, or
semitrailers.

Implicit in the language of the second part of the

statute are the basic elements of the crime: (1) property

1

When a case is tried to the bench, the court will set
aside the findings or verdict where they are against the clear
weight of the evidence, or if the court otherwise "reaches a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made . . . ."
Id. at 193.

6

belonging to another has been stolen;2 (2) the defendant was in
possession of the stolen property; (3) at the time of possessing
the property the defendant knew or believed the property was
stolen; and (4) the defendant acted purposely to deprive the
owner of the possession of the property.

See State v. Murphy.

617 P.2d 399 (Utah 1980); accord State v. Lamm. 606 P.2d 229
(Utah 1980)•
In State v. Hill, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the
burglary and second degree theft conviction of two defendants.
In Hill, the defendants visited an antique store and left without
making a purchase.

The antique store owner noticed the next

morning that some items were missing.

Meanwhile, the

defendants—one of whom owned his own antique store—were
traveling back to their home in Oregon.

Hill. 727 P.2d at 222.

At the request of Utah police officers, an Oregon police
officer investigated and found a rocking chair from the Utah
antique store in one of the defendant's van, as well as three
captain's chairs also from the Utah antique store in the
defendants' homes.

One of the defendants produced a receipt to

explain his possession of the chairs.

Id.

Testimony of other

witnesses explained that a third party had taken the chairs and
sold them to one of the defendants.

The testimony demonstrated

that the defendant "had purchased the chairs in good faith,
obtaining what he thought to be a valid bill of sale, and that

The state did not list this element in its instructions
to the jury. See T. at 11:36, 11:46-47.
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they lacked any knowledge or belief that the chairs in their
possession were stolen."

Id. at 223.

The Hill court defined the elements of theft by receiving—
for which the State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt—as
follows:
(1) the defendant received, retained, or disposed of the
property of another, (2) knowing that the property had been
stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, (3)
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof.
Id. (emphasis added).

Despite testimony from the Utah antique

store owner that one of the defendants saw one the rocking chairs
in her store, the Hill court ruled that "the evidence, taken as a
whole, was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendants knew or had reason to believe the chairs were in fact
stolen."

Xd.

Accordingly, the Hill court reversed the

defendantsf conviction.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed a trial
court's dismissal of an information of theft against a defendant
brought under Idaho Code section 18-2403(4).3
859 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Idaho 1989).

State v. Barnes,

In Barnes, the defendant was

charged in 1991 with grand theft by possession of stolen property

3

Idaho Code section 18-2403(4) provides, in relevant part,
that "[a] person commits theft when he knowingly receives, retains,
conceals, obtains control over, possesses, or disposes of stolen
property, knowing the property to have been stolen by another or
under such circumstances as would reasonably induce him to believe
that the property was stolen, and
(a) Intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or
benefit of the property. . . . "
Idaho Code § 18-2403(4).
8

based on the allegation that he possessed a new model Chevrolet
pick-up that was taken from a car dealership in 1983.
The defendant moved to dismiss the information on two
grounds; the latter being that there was insufficient evidence to
bind him over for trial.

Id. at 1387. The trial court "noted

that one of the essential elements of the crime of theft is that
some person other than the defendant be the owner of the alleged
stolen item.11

Id. at 1387. In granting the defendant's motion,

the trial court concluded that because the car dealership had
"lost its right to possession by failing to initiate a cause of
action against [the defendant] within the [] three year statute
of limitations," the State of Idaho could not show that "there
was an 'owner1 of the truck."

Id. at 1387-88. The Barnes court,

citing section 18-2402(6) of the Idaho Code, which defines
"owner," affirmed the trial court's dismissal.

Id. at 1387,

1389.
Section 18-2402(6) of the Idaho Code defines the term
"owner" to mean "any person who has the right to possession [of
the piece of property] superior to that of the taker, obtainer or
withholder."

Idaho Code § 18-2402(6).

In Utah, the very chapter

under which the State charged Mr. Ross, section 41-la-1001 of the
Utah Code Annotated defines the "owner" of a vehicle as "the
person who has the legal right to possession of the vehicle."
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1001 (1953 as amended).
In the instant case, as late as November 30, 1993, the State
of Utah told Mr. Ross that he had an "interest" in the Charger.
9

(T, at 1:159.)

Furthermore, state records listed Mr. Ross as the

owner of the Charger as late as February 2, 1994.

(T, at 1:49.)

Therefore, sufficient evidence exists to establish that Mr. Ross
was the rightful owner of the Charger; negating the first element
of the crime of receiving stolen property.

Furthermore, the

existence of documents showing Mr. Ross to be the owner of the
Charger raise substantial doubt that at the time of possessing
the Charger, Mr. Ross knew or believed the Charger was stolen;
negating the third element of the crime of stolen property.

Such

documents also bring into serious question whether Mr. Ross acted
purposely to deprive the "owner" of the possession of the
Charger; negating the fourth element of the crime of receiving
stolen property.

See Murphy, 617 P.2d 399 (discussing elements

of receiving stolen property); accord Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 (same).
In addition, the same problem that was fatal to the
prosecution1s case in Barnes is present in the instant case.

In

Barnes, the car dealership lost its right to possession by
failing to initiate a cause of action within the three year
statute of limitations.

Barnes, 859 P.2d at 1388.

Under the

Utah Uniform Commercial Code, Quick Loan was obligated to give
Mr. Ross reasonable notification "of the time after which any
private sale or other intended disposition is to be made."
Code Ann. § 70A-9-504(3) (1953 as amended).

Utah

Christopher O'Dell,

a witness for the State, testified that a "ten-day letter" was
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mailed to Mr. Ross on April 13, 1993.4

(T, at 1:74, 1:82.)

Regardless of Mr. Ross's claim that he never received Quick
Loan's letter, (T, at 1:150-151.), evidence produced at trial
show that the Charger was sold to J&K Auto on April 22 or April
23, 1993.

(T, at 1:73-74, 1:78-79, 1:80-81, 1:83, 1:86.

Arguably, if the Charger was sold on April 23, 1993, by
Quick Loan to J&K Auto, Mr. Ross may have been properly deprived
of his ownership interest in the Charger under section 70A-9504(3) of the Utah Code Annotated.

If Quick Loan had sold the

Charger on April 22, 1993, then Quick Loan did not comply with
its loan agreement with Mr. Ross,5 and therefore, did not
properly deprive Mr. Ross of his ownership interest in the
Charger through the sale to J&K Auto.
Taken together—(1) that the title to the Charger was in the
name of Mr. Ross and his spouse until at February 2, 1994, (2)
that the State of Utah notified Mr. Ross that he had an interest
in the Charger by a letter dated November 30, 1993, and (3) that
Quick Loan may not have properly deprived Mr. Ross of his
ownership interest in the Charger by failing to comply with the

4

Incidentally, at trial the State failed to produce such
a notification letter, or a copy thereof.
(T, at 1:74, 1:82,
1:87.)
5

The loan agreement
states, in relevant part:

between Mr. Ross

and

Quick

Loan

Lender will give you at least ten days notice of any public
sale or the date after which Lender will agree to have a
private sale.
(T, at 1:82, 1:150.)
11

reasonable notice requirement of section 70A-9-504(3) of the Utah
Code Annotated—reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a
reasonable doubt that Mr. Ross: (a) received the property of
another, or (b) knew or believed the property to be stolen at the
time he possessed it.
In Hill, the Supreme Court of Utah held that "the existence
of a reasonable hypothesis of innocence necessarily raises a
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt."
222.

Hill, 727 P.2d at

The facts of this case necessarily raise reasonable doubt

of Mr. Ross's guilt because a reasonable hypothesis of innocence
exists, namely that Mr. Ross was the owner of the Charger
throughout the relevant course of these proceedings, and thus,
could not be convicted of stealing his own vehicle.
Alternatively, a second hypothesis of innocence exists: given
that all of the indicia of ownership of the Charger pointed to
Mr. Ross—(1) the Charger's title was in the name of Mr. Ross and
his spouse, (2) Mr. Ross's license plates were on the Charger
when he spotted it on Main Street (T, at 1:152-154.), (3) the
State of Utah informed Mr. Ross by a letter dated November 30,
1993, that he had an interest in the Charger—a reasonable doubt
is necessarily raised as to whether Mr. Ross knew or believed
that the Charger was stolen while it was in his possession.

In

either case, because the State failed to prove a necessary
element of the crime of receiving or transferring a stolen motor
vehicle, this Court should reverse Mr. Ross's conviction.
In denying Mr. Ross's motion to dismiss at the close of the
12

state's evidence, the trial court judge said
The fact that the title on this vehicle was not changed
throughout the course of these events, in my judgment, is
not determinative of the issues before this Court. This
Defendant is charged with the crime of having received a
stolen motor vehicle. Specifically, the pertinent elements
of that crime, it seems to me, are that he had in his
possession on a given date a motor vehicle which he either
knew or should have known was stolen or unlawfully taken.
T. at 1:140.
Regardless of whether the trial court judge believed that
sufficient evidence had been presented to defeat Mr. Ross's
motion to dismiss, a review of the evidence in this case
establishes that because integral elements of the crime are
absent—such as possession of a stolen vehicle, or knowledge or
belief that the vehicle was stolen—the jury's verdict is so
lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not have
reached that verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.

Therefore, this

Court should reverse the conviction of Mr. Ross.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING MR. ROSS'S MOTION FOR
A DIRECTED VERDICT IN HIS FAVOR AT THE CLOSE OF THE
STATE'S EVIDENCE.

Based on the foregoing discussion, the facts of this case
fail to establish that Mr. Ross had possession of a stolen
vehicle.

The decision of the trial judge to deny Mr. Ross's

motion for a directed verdict was clearly erroneous and should be
reversed by this Court.
C.

BECAUSE THE OWNER OF A VEHICLE CANNOT BE CONVICTED OF
POSSESSING THAT VEHICLE WITH KNOWLEDGE OR REASON TO
BELIEVE THAT THE VEHICLE WAS STOLEN, MR. ROSS'S
CONVICTION WAS IMPROPER.

Based on the foregoing discussion, Mr. Ross was the owner of
13

the Charger on the date of the criminal information, and thus,
was improperly convicted of Receiving or Transferring a Stolen
Vehicle.
D.

Hence, his convicted should be reversed.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. ROSS'S MOTION TO
DISMISS THE STATE'S CASE.

On June 8, 1994, Mr. Ross filed a motion and memorandum to
dismiss the State's case against him.

See Addendum "A".

Implicitly, the trial court judge denied Mr. Ross's motion to
dismiss.

Based on the foregoing discussion, the trial court's

denial of Mr. Ross's motion to dismiss was erroneous.
Concomitantly, this Court should reverse Mr. Ross's conviction.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, premises considered, Mr. Ross respectfully
requests that this Court reverse his conviction under Utah Code
Ann. § 41-la-1316 and remand this matter to the trial court for
acquittal or render such other relief as justice requires.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

ISi^

day of June, 1995.

t^L

iYS

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

C^R^BERT LATHAM
^t£drney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, J. ROBERT LATHAM, HEREBY CERTIFY that eight copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102,
and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

day of June,

1995.

J3< ROBERT LATHAM
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ADDENDUM

Lowell V. Summerhays r.3.154
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS
6400 Commerce Park . ,.,.,'„
448 East 6400 South, #314 "
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-4495
Attorney for Defendant

©Opy

IN THE THIRD JUDICIl 1. DISTRICT CDTTPT 111 I " ND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
I'ldllliill ,

vs.
Civil No- 941900525FS

DERALD ROSS,
Defendant.

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

The defendant Derald Rossf by

through his counsel of

2

Adamsc

submits the following memorandum

I" Summerhays,

support of the defendant's

motion to dismiss.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The f allowing facts are summarized from

Uww

statement

presented to defendant's counsel by the p rose cution.
The defendant Derold Ross obtained a loan from Quick Loan
on

wtoiDex
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2.

' r e n d a n t d e f a u l t e d on t h e c o n t r a c t l o a n .

Charger,

3.

Derold Ross received notice that the Dodge Charger was to

be repossessed by American Recovery Service on behalf of Quick Loan
on April 15, 1993.
4.

The vehicle was found by Derold Ross parked on a street

with his license plates attached to the vehicle.
5.

On April 22, 1993, the subject vehicle was sold by Quick

Loan to J&K Auto without prior notice or consent from Derold Ross.
ARGUMENT
It is apparent from the foregoing that the vehicle sale had
been completed within seven days after the repossession occurred.
The defendant did not receive prior notice whatsoever, that
his vehicle would be sold. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-504,
the secured party, after default may sell all of the collateral of
the debtor in a reasonably commercial manner upon reasonable notice
to the debtor.
(3) [U]nless collateral is perishable or threatens
to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily
sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of
the time and place of any public sale or reasonable
notification of the time after which any private sale or
other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by
the secured party to the debtor, if he has not signed
after default a statement renouncing or modifying his
right to notification of sale, (emphasis added).
The defendant did not receive any notice that his vehicle was
being sold.
vehicle,

In order to deprive the defendant of title to his

Quick

Loan

should

have

complied

with

the

current

commercial policy of notifying the defendnat of the proposed sale.

To be convicted of theft of the automobile at issue, the
2

defendant would have had to obtain or exercise unaullicA J.UUI.1 .'.ml " •!
over the property of another with a purpose to deprive another
thereof.
A person is not guilty of theft of receiving stolen items if
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stolen motor
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knows

transferring
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believe

has oeeii stolen

taken. Utah Code Ann
Derold Ross clears 7 i *.^ .. _
with

plates attached i
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t .„ *%.- own possession.
orocedures pursuant

to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, and therefore, Deroici Ross
notice of the impending sale and never lost legal title
^

_*.*. venicie.
CONCLUSION
Derolil
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bo deprived cr legal ownership

vehicle if the lender, Quit l\ I„.o
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t o whom

s t r i c t l y followed the procedure of sale,
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and this case should respectfully be dismissed«
DATED this 6th day of June, 1994.
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